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According to The New York Times, researchers from the University of California at Berkeley's Internet 
Security Applications, Authentication, and Cryptography Group--along with the director of the 
Smartcard Developers Association, a computer programmers' organization-- have successfully cracked a 
widely used encryption method that was designed to prevent the cloning of digital telephones. What 
may be of even more significance are suspicions that the United States' (US) National Security Agency, 
Central Intelligence Agency, or other "government spy agencies" may have persuaded encryption 
designers to mathematically weaken communications security systems and/or to install secret 
"backdoors"--perhaps even posing as private cryptographers and designing and releasing their own 
(weakened) encryption programs for commercial use. These suspicions may stem from (1) the alleged 
finding that the last ten digits of the GSM standard's encryption algorithm key were zeros--a functional 
shortening of the 64-bit encryption system--(2) long-term US Government (USG) efforts to effect 
constraints and vulnerabilities concerning encryption methods in the service of national security and the 
criminal justice system, and/or (3) from various base rates of paranoia that characterize political 
perceptions and dynamics throughout the world. 
 
Regardless of the truth of the matter, a narrative analysis of US efforts to effect encryption constraints 
and vulnerabilities in the service of national security and criminal justice suggests the following paradox. 
Constraints and vulnerabilities become targets for exploitation on the part of security and criminal 
threats and can lead to legitimate users of encryption being less able to protect themselves. This is 
evermore the case when the constraints and vulnerabilities are effected less than worldwide--in fact, 
often unilaterally. As well, the salient meaning of a message or the message itself that is sought by 
counter-encryptors may be as plain as day but unrecognized respectively as meaning or message. It 
seems that being hoisted on one's petard is alive and well in an era of globalization and breathtaking 
telecommunications change. (See Encrypting encryption: Some comments on S.909, Secure Public 
Networks Act. (August 22, 1997). IBPP, 3(4); Markoff, J. (April 14, 1998). Researchers crack code in cell 
phones. The New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com; Speech by Louis J. Freeh, Director of the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, International Computer Crime Conference, March 4, 1997.) (Keywords: 
Encryption, Internet, National Security, Security, Spying, Telecommunications.) 
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